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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Marjorie Balls Krambule appeals from the district court’s order revoking her
withheld judgment for accessory to felony possession of a controlled substance and
continuing her on probation. She contends the August 2016 order revoking her withheld
judgment must be vacated because the January 2015 withheld judgment it purportedly
revokes was entered while she was proceeding pro se and had not waived her right to
counsel, and was thus void. Alternatively, she contends there is a structural defect in
this case, requiring automatic reversal of her conviction, because she was allowed to
change her plea from “not guilty” to “guilty” and was sentenced without being
represented by counsel, and without waiving her right to counsel.
This Court stated in State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387 (1981), that “[w]here a
violation of [the right to counsel] is alleged on appeal and where . . . there appears to be
some merit to the allegation, the need for efficiency in the judicial process must give
way to our primary duty to protect and preserve the basic rights accorded each citizen
by the Constitution.” Id. at 391. Such is the case here. This Court should consider the
merits of the issues Ms. Krambule raises, even though they are being raised for the first
time in this appeal, and should vacate the order revoking Ms. Krambule’s withheld
judgment, vacate her conviction, and remand this case to the district court with
instructions to allow her to withdraw her guilty plea and proceed with the assistance of
counsel.

1

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Krambule called the police to report she was being physically abused by her
husband, and was then subjected to a welfare check. (R., p.16.) Ms. Krambule gave
the police officers who arrived at her home permission to search her home, and directed
the officers to the bedroom she shared with her husband, where the officers discovered
two methamphetamine pipes. (R., p.17.) She said the pipes belonged to her husband,
but admitted using methamphetamine with him one week earlier.

(R., p.17.)

Ms. Krambule was charged by Information with felony possession of a controlled
substance. (R., pp.48-49.)
Ms. Krambule was initially represented by a public defender. (R., p.43.) While
represented by counsel, Ms. Krambule entered into an agreement with the State
pursuant to which she agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of accessory to
possession of a controlled substance pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970), and, in exchange, the State agreed to recommend a withheld judgment and
probation. (R., pp.83-91.) The Guilty Plea Questionnaire reflects that Ms. Krambule
had been diagnosed with anxiety, depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and
was taking multiple psychotropic medications.

(R., pp.83-88.)

The district court

accepted Ms. Krambule’s guilty plea and set the case for sentencing. (R., p.90.)
Prior to sentencing, Ms. Krambule filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
(R., pp.92-95.) The district court held a hearing on the motion.1 (R., pp.96-99; Mot. to
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The Clerk’s Record does not contain a copy of the transcript of the hearing on
Ms. Krambule’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Appellate counsel for Ms. Krambule
filed a Motion to Augment the Record to include a copy of this transcript, in addition to
two other transcripts, and that motion was denied by this Court on April 18, 2017.
Accordingly, Ms. Krambule is filing, simultaneously with this brief, a Motion to Augment
2

Aug., Ex. A.) As an initial matter, the district court noted “there was a lot of emotion and
a lot of reluctance that was demonstrated on the part of Ms. Krambule” at the time she
entered her guilty plea, and the change of plea “took an inordinate amount of time due
to the emotional state of Ms. Krambule and her reluctance to enter that plea.”2 (Mot. to
Aug., Ex. A at 3:15-40.) Counsel for Ms. Krambule explained to the district court that
Ms. Krambule felt she had been coerced into pleading guilty. (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A at
8:51-9:11). Ms. Krambule said she did not understand anything when she entered her
guilty plea and wanted time to obtain counsel who could help her “understand all of this
because everyone wants me to take a plea to something I didn’t do and I want a chance
to prove that.” (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A. at 11:20-12:01.) She told the district court, “I’m
doing what I’m told and I’m not understanding any of it.” (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A at 14:2933.)
The district court said it believed Ms. Krambule’s guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary, “but . . . by observing body language, by observing Ms. Krambule, I think her
subjective belief was that she had no other alternative but to enter this guilty plea.”
(Mot. to Aug., Ex. A at 32:30-33:10.) The district court granted Ms. Krambule’s motion,
finding she met her burden of showing a just reason to withdraw her guilty plea.
(R., pp.96-98; Mot. to Aug., Ex. A at 33:40-35:05.) Counsel for Ms. Krambule then
made an oral motion to withdraw, which the district court granted due to a “divide in their
relationship.” (R., p.97, Mot. to Aug., Ex. A at 35:32-54, 48:25-30, 45:15-46:15.) The

the Record to include the audio recordings of the three critical hearings that support her
arguments in this appeal. (Mot. to Aug., Exs. A-C.)
2
The district court described it as “probably the most difficult colloquy I’ve had with
respect to a change of plea since I’ve been on the bench.” (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A at
28:20-32.)
3

district court told Ms. Krambule she needed “to take whatever steps necessary to retain
private counsel in this matter.”3 (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A at 45:15-46:15.)
Ms. Krambule retained private counsel, who filed a notice of appearance on her
behalf on November 10, 2014. (R., pp.101-02.) On January 20, 2015, Ms. Krambule’s
counsel filed a motion to withdraw, stating Ms. Krambule wished to terminate the
representation and certifying that withdrawal was necessary under Rule 1.16(a)(1) of
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.4 (R., pp.137-39.) The district court held a
hearing on counsel’s motion on the morning of January 22, 2015. (Mot. to Aug., Ex. B.)
Counsel explained he had “a legitimate concern,” not touching upon the issues in this
case, which required him to move to withdraw. (Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 2:00-4:26.) The
district court asked Ms. Krambule what she intended to do if her attorney was allowed to
withdraw. (Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 7:35-40.) Ms. Krambule said, through tears, “I don’t
know.” (Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 7:41-49.) After conferring with Ms. Krambule, counsel
told the district court, “I think my client would like to get alternative legal counsel, but
how she’ll go about that, I don’t know.”

(Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 11:00-15.)

The

prosecutor told the district court he would be happy to speak with Ms. Krambule directly
if the court granted her counsel’s motion to withdraw. (Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 13:25-45.)
The district court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. (Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 16:10-

3

It is not clear from the Record why the district court did not appoint a different public
defender for Ms. Krambule at this time. There is no indication that Ms. Krambule’s
financial status improved over the course of these proceedings.
4
Rule 1.16(a)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct states that “a lawyer . . .
shall withdraw from the representation of a client if . . . the representation will result in
violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law.”
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17:00.)

The following exchange then took place between the district court and

Ms. Krambule:
Q.

Ms. Krambule, what that then means to you is that I have granted
their motion, they will be allowed to withdraw. At this point in time,
you’re not represented in these matters, and so what I would advise
you is that you’re free if you would like to today to talk to [the
prosecutor] . . . . And if you want to take the opportunity to [explore
a resolution of this case] here today, he can now talk to you. Yes?

A.

Could I get in more trouble for doing that?

Q.

Well, I don’t know. I mean if you --

A.

If we could work out a deal, I would still be able to do what we
spoke of and hire another lawyer, right?

Q.

Oh, absolutely, yes. What I would caution you about today is that
you don’t talk about anything other than this case, certainly, and
what the State may be willing to do related to this case. If you talk
about things unrelated to this case, yeah, perhaps you could find
yourself in trouble. I don’t know. Again, I don’t like to give advice
from the bench. If you talk about this case, and what [the
prosecutor] may or may not be willing to do, I can’t imagine you
getting in trouble for that.

A.

Okay.

(Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 17:01-18:36.) The district court then told Ms. Krambule, “If you
want to have a meeting with [the prosecutor] here today before you leave, I’m more than
comfortable in allowing that to occur.” (Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 19:44-56.) Ms. Krambule
was not provided with any information about her right to counsel; nor was she provided
with any information about the risks of proceeding pro se.
The district court held a hearing in the afternoon of January 22, 2015, where
Ms. Krambule appeared pro se. (Mot. to Aug., Ex. C.) The prosecutor told the district
court he had met with Ms. Krambule without an attorney, and reached an agreement
“similar to what was reached previously. (Mot. to Aug., Ex. C at 1:07-30.) According to
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the prosecutor, Ms. Krambule agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of
accessory to possession of a controlled substance, under the same conditions she had
agreed to previously, and had further agreed to proceed directly to sentencing, without
preparation of a presentence investigation report.5 (Mot. to Aug., Ex. C at 1:41-3:32.)
Ms. Krambule confirmed the agreement, but stated she wanted her plea to be an Alford
plea. (Mot. to Aug., Ex. C at 4:25-5:15.) The district court accepted Ms. Krambule’s
guilty plea “based upon the colloquy we had . . . a month or two ago.” (Mot. to Aug., Ex.
C at 5:14-30, 7:00-05.) The district court then proceeded to sentencing, stating, “I find
that it would be appropriate based upon Ms. Krambule’s condition, her stability, her
mental health, that we forego the formal presentence investigation process and proceed
to sentencing at this time in this matter.” (Mot. to Aug., Ex. C at 9:41-10:05.) The
district court imposed a withheld judgment and placed Ms. Krambule on probation for
three years. (R., pp.143-46; Mot. to Aug., Ex. C at 13:02-45.) The minute entry and
order withholding judgment was entered on January 22, 2015.

(R., pp.143-49.)

Ms. Krambule, still unrepresented, did not appeal from the order withholding judgment.
On March 22, 2016, the State filed a report of probation violation, alleging
Ms. Krambule violated probation by testing positive for methamphetamine on January
28, and February 25, 2016.

(R., pp.155-58.)

The district court held a hearing on

March 24, 2016, where Ms. Krambule appeared without counsel. (R., p.159.)

The

district court advised Ms. Krambule of her right to counsel and she stated she wished to
be represented by counsel. (R., p.159.) The district court appointed a public defender

5

Ms. Krambule also presumably waived the provision in Idaho Criminal Rule 33(a)(1)
providing that sentencing is not to occur until at least two days after a plea or verdict of
guilty unless waived by the defendant.
6

to represent Ms. Krambule. (R., p.159.) Ms. Krambule denied violating probation and
the district court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. (R., p.160.)
Before an evidentiary hearing was held, Ms. Krambule filed, through counsel, a
motion to withdraw her guilty plea and a motion for the audio recordings of the hearings
held on January 22, 2015.6 (R., pp.169-74.) The district court held an evidentiary
hearing on July 27, 2016, and found Ms. Krambule violated probation. (Tr., p.126, L.23
– p.127, L.4; R., pp.190-94.) Ms. Krambule told the district court she had not used
methamphetamine or any illegal drugs since February 21, 2014, and explained to the
court that her therapist wanted her to see a psychiatrist because “there is definitely
something wrong in my head and I definitely need to see somebody that can fix it.”
(Tr., p.136, Ls.2-8, p.137, Ls.6-8.) The district court revoked Ms. Krambule’s withheld
judgment, sentenced her to a unified term of four years, with two years fixed, and then
suspended her sentence and placed her on probation until January 22, 2019.
(R., pp.190-94; Tr., p.139, Ls.14-23.)

The order revoking withheld judgment and

continuing probation was entered on August 1, 2016. (R., pp.190-94.) Ms. Krambule
filed a timely notice of appeal, through counsel, on August 10, 2016. (R., pp.196-99.)

6

The district court did not rule on these motions. The district court stated at a hearing
on June 30, 2016, “I’m just going to treat that motion to withdraw as having been filed,
but not notice it up for a hearing. It will be incumbent upon [defense counsel], if he
wants to notice that matter up for a hearing, to do so for a later time.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.4-8.)
Defense counsel did not file a notice of hearing for either the motion to withdraw
Ms. Krambule’s guilty plea or the motion for audio recordings of the January 22, 2015
hearings.
7

ISSUES
1.

Should this Court vacate the August 2016 order revoking Ms. Krambule’s
withheld judgment because the January 2015 judgment it purportedly revokes
was entered while Ms. Krambule was proceeding pro se and had not waived her
right to counsel, and was thus void?

2.

Alternatively, should this Court vacate Ms. Krambule’s conviction for accessory to
felony possession of a controlled substance because she was allowed to change
her plea from “not guilty” to “guilty” and was sentenced without being represented
by counsel, and without waiving her right to counsel, which is a structural defect
requiring automatic reversal?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Should Vacate The August 2016 Order Revoking Ms. Krambule’s Withheld
Judgment Because The January 2015 Judgment It Purportedly Revokes Was Entered
While Ms. Krambule Was Proceeding Pro Se And Had Not Waived Her Right To
Counsel, And Was Thus Void
“The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a
person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the
assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by
imprisonment.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 (1975). Thus, an accused
may only represent himself if he “knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel.
See id. at 835; see also State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64 (2004) (“To be valid, a
waiver of the right to counsel must have been effected knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently.”). “Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of
a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should
be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open.”

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also

State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 746 (2007) (stating “[t]he district court must be
satisfied the defendant understood the inherent risks involved in waiving the right to
counsel”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Idaho Code § 19-857 (providing that a
person may waive his right to counsel if the court finds he has “acted with full
awareness of his rights and of the consequences of a waiver”).
In this case, it is strikingly clear from the record that Ms. Krambule did not have a
lawyer, and had not waived her right to a lawyer, when the district court accepted her

9

guilty plea, proceeded to sentencing, and entered a withheld judgment. (See Mot. to
Aug., Exs. B, C.) Despite her attorney’s statement that Ms. Krambule “would like to get
alternative legal counsel,” she was not advised of how she might obtain alternate
counsel after her attorney was allowed to withdraw, and was arguably encouraged by
the district court to meet with the prosecutor without the assistance of an attorney.
(Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 11:00-15.) After Ms. Krambule and the prosecutor arrived at a
plea agreement that was almost exactly the same as the agreement Ms. Krambule had
earlier disavowed, the district court accepted Ms. Krambule’s guilty plea without
engaging in any colloquy, presumably because the earlier colloquy had taken “an
inordinate amount of time” due to Ms. Krambule’s “emotional state” and her reluctance
to enter a guilty plea.

(Mot. to Aug., Ex. A at 3:15-40.)

The district court then

proceeded directly to sentencing, without any type of presentence investigation, and
without ever advising Ms. Krambule of her right to an attorney and the consequences of
waiving that right.
The only question is whether Ms. Krambule has a remedy for this obvious
constitutional violation when she failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the original
judgment (when she was, of course, unrepresented by counsel). In State v. FarfanGalvan, 161 Idaho 610, 389 P.3d 155 (2016), this Court deemed significant the holding
in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967), “that a judgment is void unless the
defendant had a lawyer or waived the right.” 161 Idaho at __, 389 P.3d at 160. In
Burgett, the United States Supreme Court held the petitioner’s Tennessee conviction
was void because the certified records of the conviction on their face raised a
presumption that the petitioner was denied his right to counsel. 389 U.S. at 114. The

10

Court reasoned that “[t]o permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v.
Wainwright [372 U.S. 335 (1963)] to be used against a person either to support guilt or
enhance punishment for another offense . . . is to erode the principle of that case.” Id.
at 115. The present case poses just as a much of a risk to the principle of Gideon v.
Wainwright as did Burgett because Ms. Krambule continues to be punished for a felony
conviction obtained in clear violation of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Following Burgett and Farfan-Galvan, this Court should conclude that the
withheld judgment entered in this case in January 2015 was void because
Ms. Krambule did not have a lawyer and had not waived her right to a lawyer when the
judgment was entered. Where a judgment is void, it is “[o]f no legal effect.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Thus, when the district court attempted to revoke
Ms. Krambule’s withheld judgment in August 2016, there was nothing to revoke. The
district court could not revoke a withheld judgment that was void, and this Court can and
should vacate the district court’s August 2016 order in this appeal. See Meyers v.
Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 291 (2009) (agreeing with the defendant that void judgments
can be attacked at any time).

II.
Alternatively, This Court Should Vacate Ms. Krambule’s Conviction For Accessory To
Felony Possession Of A Controlled Substance Because She Was Allowed To Change
Her Plea From “Not Guilty” To “Guilty” And Was Sentenced Without Being Represented
By Counsel, And Without Waiving Her Right To Counsel, Which Is A Structural Defect
Requiring Automatic Reversal
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), this Court explained that “some
constitutional rights are so basic to a fair trial that the violation of those rights requires
an automatic reversal and is not subject to harmless error analysis.”
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Id. at 222

(discussing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991)). The Court explained
that certain errors, including the complete denial of counsel, constitute structural defects
which are so inherently unfair that they defy harmless error review. See id. (citing
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); see also Bement v. State, 91 Idaho 388,
395 (1966) (noting the right to counsel has been described as “the most pervasive right
of an accused” which has been accorded a “singular significance”) (quotation marks
omitted). In this case, it is clear from the record that Ms. Krambule was denied her
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when she changed her plea from “not guilty” to
“guilty” and was sentenced while proceeding pro se and without having waived her right
to counsel. This was a structural defect in the proceedings which requires reversal of
her conviction.
Alternatively, this Court can construe the error as fundamental error, which
requires reversal of Ms. Krambule’s conviction even though the issue was not raised in
the district court. In State v. Jackson, 140 Idaho 636 (Ct. App. 2004), the Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine and
possession of paraphernalia, concluding he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel through the trial court’s acceptance of an invalid waiver. Id. at 641. The Court
considered the issue even though it was not raised in the district court, explaining the
deprivation of the right to counsel is a constitutional error that “cast[s] such doubt upon
the fairness of the trial process that [it is] deemed prejudicial per se.”

Id. at 641.

Similarly, in State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623 (1994), this Court rejected the State’s
argument that the Court should decline to review the voluntariness of the defendant’s
waiver of the right to counsel because the issue was not raised in the trial court. Id. at
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625. The Court held the claimed error “qualifies as fundamental error,” which it defined
as “error which so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and
deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due process.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 64 (rejecting the State’s argument that
the Court should decline to review the issue of the voluntaries of the defendant’s waiver
of the right to counsel, concluding it qualifies as fundamental error).
Though it appears, post-Perry, that the issue presented in this case is one of
structural error rather than fundamental error, the relief Ms. Krambule is entitled to is the
same under either formulation. Because it is clear from the record that Ms. Krambule
was denied her Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the proceedings leading up to the
entry of the withheld judgment in January 2015, and is continuing to suffer the
consequences of her felony conviction, she is entitled to relief even though this issue is
being raised for the first time in this appeal.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Krambule respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
order revoking her withheld judgment, vacate her conviction, and remand this case to
the district court with instructions to allow Ms. Krambule to withdraw her guilty plea, and
proceed with the assistance of counsel.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2017.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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